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DEBATE 
THE CONTRACEPTION MANDATE AND RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 
OPENING STATEMENT 
The Hard and Easy Case of the Contraception Mandate 
STEVEN D. SMITH† 
There are hard cases, and then there are easy cases. The Department 
of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) contraception mandate (the 
Contraception Mandate) gives rise to both. 
 Whether the Mandate violates current free exercise doctrine presents a 
hard case, in part because the doctrine, with its malleable notions of “neutral” 
and “generally applicable,” is easily manipulated. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 881 (1990). I would argue that the Mandate is riddled with such 
substantial exceptions that it cannot be regarded as a neutral law of general 
applicability. But given doctrinal squishiness, it is hard to be confident. 
By contrast, whether enforcing the Mandate against objecting religious 
employers violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006), presents an easy case. Objecting 
religious employers declare, evidently in good faith, that compliance with 
the Mandate would require them to violate non-trivial religious commit-
ments. See, e.g., HHS Mandate Information Central, BecketFund.org, 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Mar. 24, 
2013) (aggregating legal documents and news about scores of cases filed 
 
† Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
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against the Mandate). By demanding compliance, therefore, the Mandate 
substantially burdens their exercise of religion. But RFRA prohibits the 
federal government from imposing such burdens unless the government has 
a compelling interest that cannot be achieved by less restrictive means. 
Although there is no metric for measuring the strength of asserted govern-
ment interests, any claim that the government’s interest is compelling is 
belied in this instance by the gaping exceptions the Mandate itself grants. See 
26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2011 supp.) (small business exception), 42 U.S.C. § 18011 
(2011 supp.) (grandfather exception). And even if the interest were compelling, 
critics have identified a variety of feasible, less restrictive ways in which that 
interest could be achieved. See, e.g., Ed Whelan, The HHS Contraception 
Mandate vs. RFRA—“Least Restrictive Means”, Nat’l Rev. (Jan. 27, 2013), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/289534/hhs-contraception-
mandate-vs-rfra-least-restrictive-means-ed-whelan. 
So then why do many competent lawyers argue for the opposite conclu-
sion? In part the answer has to do with strength of motivations: many 
people ardently want the Mandate to be enforced, even (or could it be 
especially?) against religious employers. But something more complicated 
and interesting is also going on. Familiar arguments supporting the Man-
date are palpably unpersuasive, I think, if taken as arguments about the 
meaning or application of RFRA. But those arguments are more substantial if 
they are taken as tacitly addressing a different question—whether the 
American commitment to special protection for religious freedom ought to be 
maintained. And as it happens, that latter question is increasingly a live one 
in the legal academy and in American politics. 
Many people who argue that the Mandate does not violate RFRA can 
be better understood as contending, wittingly or unwittingly, that religion 
should not receive special, legal protection. And one reason why the 
Contraception Mandate controversy seems so important, even to religious 
believers (like myself) whose faith does not proscribe the use of contracep-
tives, is that the controversy is a contest in miniature over the fate and 
future of religious freedom in America. 
Consider the argument over whether the Contraception Mandate bur-
dens the religious exercise of objecting employers. If we were merely trying 
to apply RFRA in accordance with received understandings of what the free 
exercise of religion means, then two simple facts ought to be dispositive. 
First, Catholic and other religious employers declare that compliance with 
the Mandate would force them to violate non-trivial religious commit-
ments. Second, these declarations seem to be sincere. These two facts do not 
mean, of course, that objectors will ultimately be excused from complying 
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with the law; there is still the “compelling interest” qualification. But the 
facts do establish that religious exercise has been substantially burdened. 
In response, defenders of the Mandate could claim that the objecting 
employers are insincere. But that would be a tough argument to make, and 
most defenders do not rely on it. Instead they claim, in essence, that the 
employers are mistaken in their belief that compliance with the Mandate 
would violate their religious commitments. The bishops or university 
presidents or other employers may believe that providing insurance cover-
ing contraceptives (and in many employers’ view, some abortifacients) 
would involve an impermissible “cooperation with evil,” but in fact it 
wouldn’t. See Robert T. Miller, The HHS Mandate, Cooperation with Evil, 
and Coercion, ThePublicDiscourse.com (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www. 
thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/02/4817/ (discussing the doctrine of “coopera-
tion with evil” and the Mandate). Or the employers may think that provid-
ing such insurance would unacceptably compromise their Christian 
witness; but, again, they are wrong. 
With the respect to the question of RFRA’s meaning and application, 
however, such arguments wholly miss the mark. To be sure, Catholics (and 
others) properly debate whether Catholic doctrines regarding “cooperation 
with evil” forbid Catholic employers to provide insurance covering contra-
ceptives. In like manner, people both inside and outside a religious institu-
tion may debate whether some action—such as providing insurance that 
covers contraceptives—would compromise the institution’s religious 
witness. These are important debates, but in applying RFRA, they should 
be irrelevant. What matters, under both the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA, is 
whether a person—or in this case an employer—sincerely believes that 
compliance with the Mandate would violate religious duties. Conversely, 
arguments that a believer is mistaken in sincerely supposing that his or her 
religion forbids something have long and properly been deemed incompati-
ble with any serious respect for the free exercise of religion. Thus, when 
Eddie Thomas concluded that working in the production of munitions was 
forbidden by his religion, even fellow Jehovah’s Witnesses could doubt that 
Thomas had correctly understood his own faith. But it was not a court’s job, 
the Supreme Court observed, “to inquire whether [Thomas] or his fellow 
worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.” 
What mattered was that Thomas sincerely believed his religion prohibited him 
from working in munitions. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981). 
No other position is compatible with a meaningful commitment to reli-
gious freedom. After all, during the centuries in which heresy and apostasy 
laws were enforced, a central premise for such repression was precisely that 
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those prosecuted for such transgressions were mistaken—perhaps willfully 
mistaken—about their own religion: that is why these laws were enforced 
only against persons deemed to be (deviant) Christians, not against Jews or 
others who had never been Christian. See Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: An 
Historical Perspective, in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective 17, 
25-26, 30-33 (John Witte, Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver eds. 1996). By 
contrast, modern commitments to religious freedom necessarily relin-
quished this premise, embracing instead the idea that persons or associa-
tions can determine for themselves what they believe, and that it is no 
business of the state (or the courts) to correct their supposed errors. In 
seeking to subject employers’ religious beliefs to critical examination and 
rejection, and on that basis denying that their religious exercise is burdened 
(even if the employers sincerely believe it is), advocates of the Mandate to 
that extent revert to the medieval premise that the more modern commit-
ment to religious freedom sought to repudiate. 
Professor Caroline Corbin engages in a variant of this kind of reasoning 
when she makes much of survey evidence indicating that most American 
Catholics do not believe the use of artificial contraceptives is morally wrong, 
and that most Catholic women actually use contraceptives. These facts may 
be of interest to sociologists, for example, or church leaders (and also, of 
course, to political strategists). But what exactly is their relevance for free 
exercise purposes? Corbin claims, it seems, that what counts as Catholic belief 
or teaching should be determined not by what church authorities teach but 
rather by what a majority of Catholics believe. See Caroline Mala Corbin, The 
Contraception Mandate, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 151, 156-57 (2012). So 
Catholic employers are not burdened by the Mandate because Catholicism 
does not actually oppose contraception; its leaders only think it does.  
As an argument about the meaning and application of RFRA, this con-
tention commits the same error just considered, and then compounds the 
error. Thus, Corbin’s majoritarian argument in effect tells Catholic employ-
ers (and Catholic bishops and theologians) that they are mistaken about 
their own doctrines. They believe Catholic teaching opposes contraceptives 
but in fact (under Corbin’s majoritarian criterion) it doesn’t. Even Catho-
lics who disagree with their church about contraception might easily spot 
the error here: it is entirely possible for an individual Catholic to believe 
that the church is mistaken on some teaching while acknowledging that this 
is the church’s teaching (just as it is possible for you or me to think that the 
Supreme Court got some decision badly wrong while acknowledging that 
this was the Court’s decision and that the Court had the authority to make 
it). But Corbin’s argument does not merely tell Catholic objectors to the 
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Mandate that their beliefs about Catholic doctrine are mistaken; it attempts 
to redefine the church itself from the outside. After all, the Roman Catholic 
Church is and always has been a hierarchical church; its doctrines have 
never been determined by simply polling the membership. Corbin’s argu-
ment, however, would in essence take authority to pronounce doctrine away 
from bishops and church councils and transfer that authority to the laity. 
There have, of course, been plenty of historical instances of secular rul-
ers telling churches not only what their doctrines shall be but how those 
doctrines are to be formulated and who gets to do the formulating. Corbin’s 
approach resonates with that precedent. So hers is not an impossible 
position to hold; it is merely incompatible with any serious respect for 
religious freedom, or at least for any freedom that extends to religion’s 
associational or institutional dimension. 
Consider one final example. Objecting employers argue that even if the 
government believes there is a compelling interest in ensuring that women 
have insurance covering contraceptives, the government could achieve that 
interest in ways “less restrictive” of religious exercise. Edward Whelan, The 
HHS Contraception Mandate vs. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 87 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 2179, 2186 (2012). One obvious and “less restrictive 
means” would be for government itself to pay for the coverage instead of 
forcing other people to pay for it. See id. Purporting to respond to this 
point, the Issue Brief of the American Constitution Society asserts that “a 
religious person’s right to an exemption does not include the right to 
demand that the government pay for the exemption. The government may 
do this if it chooses, but it is not constitutionally required to do so.” Freder-
ick Mark Gedicks, Am. Constitution Soc’y for Law & Policy, With Religious 
Liberty for All: A Defense of the Affordable Care Act’s Contraception 
Coverage Mandate 17 (2012), available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/ 
default/files/Gedicks_-_With_Religious_Liberty_for_All_1.pdf. 
This assertion mischaracterizes the employers’ argument; it is also whol-
ly unresponsive to that argument, and to the law as Congress enacted it. 
The employers are emphatically not “demand[ing] that government pay for” 
contraceptive coverage—or that anyone else pay for it. They are merely 
arguing that, under RFRA, and given their religious objections, they 
themselves should not be required to pay for the coverage, and to that end 
are pointing out a fact that RFRA itself makes centrally relevant—that 
there are “less restrictive means” of achieving the government’s objective. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2006). If RFRA’s requirement could be defeated 
merely by recharacterizing arguments about “less restrictive means,” as 
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demands that government affirmatively act in some way, the statutory 
requirement would in effect be read out of the law. 
Which may be the real point. The Issue Brief’s argument resonates with 
a familiar position that would refuse (or at least refuse to mandate) any 
affirmative accommodation of religion: government should not persecute or 
discriminate against religion; but so long as government acts for legitimate 
reasons or interests, it need not go to any trouble or expense in order to 
accommodate religious believers. 
This is a perfectly familiar and respectable position, shared by many 
scholars, judges, and government officials. But it is emphatically not the 
position of RFRA, which explicitly commands affirmative accommoda-
tion of religion (subject, once again, to the “compelling interest” and 
“less restrictive means” requirements). See 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(b). 
That is why the Issue Brief’s contention is at the same time entirely off 
the mark as an interpretation of RFRA but potentially appealing if taken 
as a stand-alone proposition. 
I have suggested that the Contraception Mandate presents an easy case 
under RFRA: enforcement of the Mandate against objecting religious 
employers would violate the statute. Contrary arguments typically do not 
really engage the statute so much as evade or tacitly reject it. Their rhetori-
cal force comes not from the statute, with its deliberate policy favoring 
affirmative accommodation of religious exercise, but rather from a different 
position that opposes any such accommodation. 
As it happens, that anti-accommodationist position increasingly finds 
favor with legal academics. Why should religion be singled out for special 
constitutional treatment? (Or at least for special favorable treatment: those 
same academics are typically happy enough with special restrictions that 
prohibit government from subsidizing or endorsing religion in the way it 
subsidizes and endorses other interests and views.) Douglas Laycock reports 
that “scholars from all points on the spectrum now question whether there 
is any modern justification for religious liberty.” Douglas Laycock, Sex, 
Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 407, 423 
(2011). A similar position was evident in the Obama Administration’s stance 
in the recent Hosanna-Tabor case, in which the Solicitor General argued, 
unsuccessfully, against giving religious institutions any special, constitu-
tional right to select their ministerial employees on the basis of their 
religious doctrines and commitments. 
Whether the nation’s long standing commitment to special protection 
for religious freedom should now be discarded presents a major historic 
decision that is likely to become even more conspicuously contested in 
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coming years. See generally Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Decline of 
American Religious Freedom (forthcoming Harvard University Press 2013). 
Substantial, good faith arguments can be made on both sides, I think. But 
that decision is not one that courts considering challenges to the Contracep-
tion Mandate should take upon themselves. 
The question for them is whether the Contraception Mandate, as 
applied to objecting religious employers, violates a statute that Congress 
enacted and the President signed into law. And that question, as I have 
argued, presents an easy case. 
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REBUTTAL 
Two Easy Cases: Nonprofit and For-profit Corporate Challenges to the 
Contraception Mandate 
CAROLINE MALA CORBIN† 
Preventive health care just got a lot more accessible. Under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, health insurance plans must now offer 
a range of preventive services without demanding any kind of copayment, 
coinsurance, or deductible. Children can receive free vaccinations; adults 
can receive free cancer screenings; and women can receive free contracep-
tion. This last requirement, often called “the Contraception Mandate,” has 
led to a flurry of lawsuits by religiously affiliated employers. These  
employers argue that their religion condemns the use of artificial birth 
control, and that by making them include these drugs in the plans they 
provide to employees, the government is forcing them to violate their 
religious beliefs. These plaintiffs claim the Mandate “substantially burdens” 
their “religious exercise” and violates the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA). 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006). It does not.1  
Before explaining why the Contraception Mandate does not impose a 
substantial burden on anyone’s religious conscience, and in any event passes 
strict scrutiny, I would like to make a few clarifications about the Mandate’s 
scope. First, it does not apply to houses of worship or other “religious 
employers” as defined by the IRS. Thus, churches, synagogues, and 
mosques are completely exempt. Second, religiously affiliated nonprofits do 
not have to pay for contraception or even include it in their health care 
plans. Instead, their insurance provider (or, if they are self-insured, an 
independent provider working with a third-party administrator) will 
provide and pay for a separate policy. Finally, the plaintiffs in these cases 
are not individuals, but large organizations, nonprofit and for-profit, whose 
employees do not necessarily share their faith or beliefs.  
 
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami Law School. 
1 My recent essay, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLL. 151 (2012), provides 
supporting citations for many of the arguments presented here. It also addresses the constitution-
ality of the Mandate.  
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I. SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN ON RELIGIOUS EXERCISE 
In order to support a claim under RFRA, an employer must establish 
that the Mandate imposes a substantial religious burden. See id. According 
to Professor Smith, to meet this requirement, all plaintiffs ought to have to 
do is assert—sincerely—that a law substantially burdens their religious 
conscience. Thus, once a Catholic institution argues, sincerely, that it is an 
affront to conscience to offer contraception as part of its employees’ health 
care package because it coerces the endorsement and facilitation of reli-
giously proscribed conduct, the organization or corporation must be exempt 
from the Mandate unless the Mandate passes strict scrutiny. See supra at 
262. Professor Smith argues that to subject the entities’ claims to any kind 
of scrutiny reveals a hidden agenda to eliminate religious accommodations 
and revives the medieval practice of the government rather than the church 
dictating the content of religious doctrine. See supra at 263. 
The first problem with Professor’s Smith deferential approach to the 
“substantial burden” inquiry is that most RFRA claims here are brought 
by institutions, not individuals. When an individual says, this act burdens 
my Catholic conscience, we clearly know whose conscience is at issue. But 
when an institution says, this act burdens our Catholic conscience, that 
clarity is lacking. Is it the institution’s conscience? If so, do institutions 
even have a conscience in the way that real people do? If the argument is 
that the institutional conscience embodies, represents, or stands in for the 
individual consciences of its members, then it might be worth investigat-
ing members’ view of the matter.  
Polls indicate that the vast majority of American Catholics neither op-
pose contraception nor find its use inconsistent with being “a good  
Catholic.” See, e.g., CBS News Poll, Apr. 2011, The Roper Center at the 
University of Connecticut (Mar. 2011), http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ 
data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html In fact, almost all sexually active Catholic 
women in the United States have relied on contraception at some point in 
their lives, and most Catholics want the Pope to drop the Church’s official 
condemnation of it. See RACHEL K. JONES & JOERG DREWEKE, 
GUTTMACHER INST., COUNTERING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: NEW 
EVIDENCE ON RELIGION AND CONTRACEPTIVE USE, at 4 (2011) available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/Religion-and-Contraceptive-Use.pdf;  
USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll Results, USA TODAY (May 20, 2005), http:// 
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/2005-04-03-poll.htm. 
If most American Catholics have no religious objection to contraception and 
wish the Church would change its position, then it is hard to see how 
making contraception available violates their conscience.  
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Professor Smith sees this argument as beside the point, given that  
official church doctrine condemns artificial birth control, and as highly 
problematic, since it encourages the state to make pronouncements about 
the internal doctrine of a church, something the state has no business doing. 
But it is not beside the point: before the state grants a religious accommo-
dation that will impose on others, it has an obligation to ensure that  
people’s consciences are actually substantially burdened.  
As for Professor’s Smith worry that this inquiry will necessarily require 
the state to rule on theological questions beyond its institutional compe-
tence, his concern is not entirely misplaced. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
abandoned the substantial burden test for Free Exercise Clause claims in 
large part because the Court did not want to have to decide whether a 
religious burden was slight or substantial, sincere or insincere. See, e.g., 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990) (wondering “what 
principle of law or logic [could] be brought to bear to contradict a believer’s 
assertion that a particular act is ‘central’ to his faith”). Professor Smith 
believes this risk can be averted if the state automatically defers to church 
leadership as to what constitutes a substantial burden. Here, he argues, the 
Catholic Church condemns contraception, and it is official, Vatican policy 
that should prevail when analyzing whether a Catholic institution has been 
substantially burdened. See supra at 264-65. What this approach masks, 
however, is that the state must inevitably make a decision about whose view 
of Catholic conscience should control: the leadership or the membership. 
Professor Smith might respond that when people join a hierarchal organiza-
tion, they implicitly concede to the hierarchy’s control of such matters. But 
what if the members of the organization disagree? What if, as is the case 
with American Catholics today, the members of the organization concede 
no such thing? See CNN & ORC, POLL 3 (2012), available at 
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2012/images/02/16/rel2g.pdf. Should the state 
tell them they are wrong and ignore their perspective? In short, the clash 
between the majority membership and the minority leadership should at 
the least raise questions about whether the Mandate imposes a substan-
tial burden on an institution’s conscience.  
It is even harder to sustain a RFRA conscience claim when the institu-
tion is a for-profit corporation that manufactures automobile lights, cabinet 
doors, or HVAC equipment (as some of the current plaintiffs do). To start, 
there is no indication in its legislative history or language that RFRA was 
ever meant to protect for-profit corporations. In addition, for-profit corpo-
rations are not First Amendment rights holders in the same way that actual 
people are. While the Supreme Court has held that corporate speech is 
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protected by the Free Speech Clause in cases like Citizens United, they did 
so not because corporations have a right to speak, but because audiences 
have the right to hear all points of view, whatever their source. As for 
corporate freedom of association and corporate free exercise, the Supreme 
Court has summarily rejected the former in at least one case and never 
recognized the latter. It is not surprising then that RFRA did not contem-
plate protecting enterprises whose primary purpose is to earn a profit.  
The second problem with Professor’s Smith deferential approach to 
evaluating substantial burden is that even the most remote burdens must be 
accommodated if a law fails strict scrutiny. For example, if an institution 
considers it “cooperation with evil” to allow its employees to use their salary 
to purchase contraception, buy alcohol, or see a movie celebrating same-sex 
marriage, then we—according to Professor Smith—should defer to its 
sincere claims, and permit it to impose conditions on its employees’ salaries 
unless laws that prohibit such conditions pass strict scrutiny. But  
exemptions do not occur in a vacuum. Not only are the religious rights of 
those who want an exemption implicated, but also the rights of those who 
are affected by an exemption (in this case, the employees). Deciding 
whether to grant a religious exemption involves a balancing act, and the 
calibration is off when employees’ purchasing decisions can be considered a 
substantial burden on an employer’s religious conscience.  
Any burden on religious conscience created by the Contraception 
Mandate is similarly attenuated. No entity is forced to use, dispense, or—
except for for-profit corporations—pay for contraception. Indeed, under 
the latest compromise, religious nonprofits do not even have to cover 
contraception in their health care plans; instead, their health insurance 
company will offer a separate policy free of charge.  
Nor is any entity being compelled to endorse contraception use. In ana-
lyzing endorsement in a case challenging a school voucher program, the 
Supreme Court held that no reasonable person would conclude the govern-
ment was endorsing religion even though most of the government’s voucher 
money went to religious schools and might well have been used to promote 
religious activities like prayer, or to provide theological education. Why? 
The money ended up in religious schools’ coffers as a result of the genuine 
and independent choice of private individuals. Any endorsement of religion 
should be attributed to the individual who chooses a religious school, not to 
the government that created the voucher program. Likewise, here, any 
endorsement of contraception should be attributed to the individual em-
ployee who chooses to use it, not to the employer that provided the health 
insurance plan (or access to a third party’s plan, in the case of nonprofits).  
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Besides, reasonable people will understand that complying with a law 
does not always equal endorsement of that law, and particularly that 
providing government-mandated health care does not mean endorse-
ment of every service offered. Because of state mandates, many Catholic 
institutions already include contraception in their health care plans, yet 
no reasonable person would conclude that the Vatican now supports 
contraception. This is especially true given that nothing impedes the 
religious entities from making their beliefs known. On the contrary, 
employers are free to declare their opposition.  
Still, even if a reasonable person would understand that the religious 
employers are not endorsing contraception, perhaps the employers are 
facilitating its use by making contraception more affordable. But arguing 
that it imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise to make 
something more affordable via employees’ compensation—whether it be 
by a larger salary or by a more comprehensive health care package—is 
simply too attenuated a claim to stand. After all, paying employees more 
than minimum wage also facilitates contraception use, yet no one would 
argue that religious employers should be exempt from minimum wage 
laws. In short, any facilitation simply does not rise to the level of a 
substantial burden on religious exercise.  
II. STRICT SCRUTINY 
In any case, the Contraception Mandate passes RFRA’s strict scrutiny 
requirement, as it advances several compelling state interests by means that 
are narrowly tailored. It is not difficult to come up with compelling reasons 
why working women who do not wish to become pregnant should have 
access to contraception. Nor is there a more narrowly tailored means of 
increasing access to contraception for women whose religiously affiliated 
employer provides health insurance.  
The Mandate advances several compelling state interests. Promoting 
health is a compelling state interest, and increasing access to contraception 
improves women’s health and leads to healthier pregnancies since women 
with planned pregnancies are more likely to seek prenatal care. Promoting 
women’s bodily integrity and women’s equality are also compelling state 
interests, and as legions of commentators have noted, without the ability to 
control whether and when to have children, women could not participate as 
equal citizens in the social, economic, and political life of the nation. 
Finally, the state has a compelling interest in combatting sex discrimination 
in the provision of health care benefits—the likely consequence of health 
insurance plans that covers men’s basic needs but not women’s. The fact 
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that there are exceptions to the law—which are available to religious and 
nonreligious employers alike—does not negate the importance of women’s 
well-being, personal autonomy, and equality.  
Professor Smith, however, suggests that the law is not narrowly tailored 
and therefore fails strict scrutiny because the government could achieve its 
goals by alternate means, namely, by directly providing or subsidizing 
contraception. But imagine a medical practice that refuses to see Hispanic 
patients, or an employer who provides insurance covering cancer screenings 
for white employees but not Asian ones. Now imagine that the medical 
practice or employer argues that a law banning race discrimination in places 
of public accommodation or the provision of employment benefits is not 
narrowly tailored because the government could provide the ser-
vices/benefits instead. Such a claim would obviously fail, and Professor 
Smith’s argument should fail as well. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Professor Smith is no doubt correct that some who oppose exemptions 
to the Mandate oppose all religious accommodations. Yet, one can support 
exemptions for religious individuals and still conclude that exemptions for 
large organizations challenging the Contraception Mandate are inappropri-
ate. Indeed, for those who care about individual conscience, it is important 
not to overlook the consciences of those employees who do not share the 
religious beliefs of their employers. “RFRA is a shield, not a sword . . .  . It 
is not a means to force one’s religious practices upon others.” O’Brien v. 
U.S. Dep’t Health Human Servs., No. 4:12-476 (CEJ), 2012 WL 4481208, at 
*6 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012). Employees who work at religiously affiliated 
hospitals, schools, and charities, or at factories and stores with religious 
management, may have their own moral and religious reasons for limiting 
their family size. As the Supreme Court has said in regard to another social 
welfare program (social security taxes), excusing religious employers 
“operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees.” United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 253 (1982). The same would be true here.  
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Free Exercise for “Large Organizations” 
STEVEN D. SMITH 
 Readers will have noticed that the order of presentation in this brief 
debate seems to have flipped: Professor Corbin’s ostensible response reads 
more like an opening statement—to which my ostensible opening statement 
reads like a response. The reason for this reversal, probably, is that  
Professor Corbin had already published a defense of the Mandate, which I 
cited and addressed in my opening statement, and her current submission 
largely repeats the arguments she previously made. Thus, Professor Corbin 
again claims that the Mandate does not substantially burden objecting 
employers’ exercise of religion, even if they sincerely believe it requires 
them to violate non-trivial religious obligations. And she again claims that 
the Catholic position on contraception should be determined by survey data 
reporting the opinions of church members rather than by the church’s 
official doctrine as expounded by church leaders. My own statement has 
already addressed these claims, and there seems little point in repeating the 
arguments. So instead I will try to clarify a couple of key points and then 
briefly address what seems to be a major division between us. 
Professor Corbin understands me to maintain that in order to establish a 
burden on religious exercise, “all plaintiffs ought to have to do is assert—
sincerely—that a law substantially burdens their religious conscience.” Supra 
at 269. Let me try to be a bit more precise. It would be more accurate to say 
that the law (meaning, in this instance, RFRA, as enacted by Congress and 
interpreted by the courts) gets to say what counts as a burden, but that 
whether some particular legal requirement in fact imposes such a burden depends 
on the actual religious commitments of those subjected to the requirement. 
So if I say, “It weighs on my conscience and offends my religion that our 
government permits abortions [or conducts drone strikes, or closes its 
borders, or whatever],” an apt answer would be, “Too bad. You may be 
perfectly sincere, but that is not what it means in our law to impose a 
‘burden’ on religion.” Conversely, if I report that a legal requirement to do 
X would force me to violate some sincere, substantial religious commitment 
that I hold, then my religious exercise is burdened, because that is the sort 
of imposition the law regards as a “burden.” And if someone then contends 
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that I am mistaken because I have misunderstood my own religion (which 
they think does not or should not really prohibit X), they might, in some 
sense, be correct—maybe my theological or scriptural understanding is 
flawed—but their contention also wholly misses the point. Religious 
freedom under our Constitution and laws means that no outsider—and 
certainly not the government—gets to tell me what my faith is, or what my 
faith does or does not prohibit. 
The critic is even more off base if she contends that a legal require-
ment would not be burdensome as measured by some other (religious or 
secular) standard or criteria. And yet, in rejecting the employers’ sincere 
claims of burden, this is precisely the position taken by Professor 
Corbin, and typically, by other Mandate supporters. The anomaly is 
perhaps most conspicuous in Professor Corbin’s argument that because a 
taxpayer would not be deemed under establishment clause doctrine to 
endorse the religion of private schools that might receive public support 
through a voucher program, a Christian employer is mistaken if he 
sincerely claims, based on his Christian faith, that his Christian mission 
and witness would be compromised by providing insurance coverage that 
includes contraceptives or abortifacients. Professor Corbin’s comparison 
and conclusion add up to a stark non sequitur. 
All of this is not to say, of course, that religious objectors should au-
tomatically be excused from obeying a law so long as their objections are 
sincere. Under RFRA, religious exercise may be burdened if this is 
necessary to achieve a compelling interest that cannot be achieved 
through less restrictive means. Professor Corbin dislikes this “strict 
scrutiny” approach. She worries that many harmful practices might get 
legal protection under this test, and she gives as an example a hypothet-
ical  employer whose religion would be burdened if employees “use their 
salary to purchase contraception, buy alcohol, or see a movie celebrating 
same-sex marriage.” Supra at 271. 
The argument is reminiscent of Justice Scalia’s “parade of horribles” in 
Employment Division v. Smith, offered to justify denying free exercise 
accommodation. See 494 U.S. 872, 888-89 (1990). But in enacting RFRA, 
Congress rejected that “parade of horribles” argumentation—and for good 
reason. For one thing, the horribles rarely materialize. Professor Corbin’s 
hypothetical officious employer would likely have a hard time enticing 
qualified people into his employ: his freedom of religion does not mean that 
anybody has to work for him. And in any case, in enacting RFRA (with its 
explicit “compelling interest” provision), Congress evidently determined 
that the commitment to free exercise was worth the costs. In overtly 
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opposing that compelling interest test, Professor Corbin obligingly corrobo-
rates the thesis of my opening statement: Mandate supporters are in reality 
arguing not so much under or about RFRA, but rather against it. 
Perhaps Professor Corbin’s and my most fundamental disagreement is 
revealed in her questioning whether freedom of religion should extend to 
institutions as well as individuals. Her reluctance to protect “institutions,” 
or “large organizations,” is evident from start to finish. “[O]ne can support 
exemptions for religious individuals,” she says in closing, “and yet still 
conclude that exemptions for large organizations challenging the Mandate are 
inappropriate.” See supra at 273 (emphasis added). 
On first look, this position may be appealing. After all, isn’t it people who 
have consciences, and who elicit our concern—not “large organizations”? 
On closer examination, though, Professor Corbin’s position favoring 
free exercise protection for “religious individuals” but not for institutions 
fundamentally misconceives the real human concerns at stake and commits 
a central error that religious freedom is calculated to avoid. The manifest 
fact is that although some people’s religion is purely private in character, 
many other peoples’ religious commitments are more communal, leading 
them to form, or join, or join together in associations or institutions to 
which they attribute religious significance. 
Sometimes, such institutions are necessary for carrying out the religion’s 
mission of service to the world: Catholic hospitals would be an example. 
Sometimes the communal character of the commitment is even more 
essential—almost, we might say, metaphysical. Often, religious associations 
are not merely instances of individuals acting in concert in order to better 
further their own individual ends (as in a buying co-op, say, or a labor 
union). Rather, for these believers, the association itself—the communion—
may be at the heart of what religion is. 
In this respect, a religious institution is not like a union—a musicians’ 
union, maybe—but more like an orchestra. There are forms of music—
symphonies or concertos, for example—that simply cannot be performed by 
(as we might say) “musical individuals” acting on their own; this music can 
only come into being by musicians acting in concert, as a unit. Suppose 
someone were to propose that it is individual musicians—real human 
beings—who matter, not “large musical organizations,” and that we should 
accordingly respect and further the work of individual musicians and 
composers, but not of musical “institutions,” like orchestras. The proposal 
would be not merely misguided, but internally contradictory or self-
defeating, because it would prevent many musicians and composers from 
making the kind of music they feel called to make. 
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Professor Corbin’s preference for protecting “religious individuals” but 
not religious institutions is misguided in much the same way. Viewed 
merely as abstract, impersonal entities, “institutions” and “organizations” 
may not elicit our concern. We care, maybe, about persons. But to deny free 
exercise protection to such institutions and organizations is to frustrate the 
free exercise of persons—of the very “religious individuals” about whom 
Professor Corbin expresses concern. 
It is true, of course, that people in religious institutions will sometimes 
disagree, with their leaders and with each other. (Just as people in musical 
groups—or business associations, or political parties, or pretty much any 
collective human enterprise—will often disagree.) And such disagreements 
can present challenges both for the associations themselves and, sometimes, 
for the law. Dissenters often find that their disagreements are sufficiently 
substantial that they choose to leave an institution; at least in the area of 
religion, our law categorically protects their right to do so. But insofar as 
such associations serve vital human purposes—purposes valuable to the 
individuals who compose the associations—the existence of disagreement is 
no reason to deny recognition or protection to the associations. 
To be sure, many people—Professor Corbin may be one—incline to-
ward more private or atomistic forms of religion. That is their right: our 
commitment to religious freedom, manifest both in the First Amendment 
and in RFRA, respects and protects that more inward-looking inclination. 
But our commitment does not impose such privatistic preferences (or 
permit Professor Corbin and like-minded believers to impose them) any 
more than it permits the more communally-oriented believers to impose 
their religious preferences. Such imposition is impermissible, from whichev-
er direction it may come. That, surely, is what religious freedom means.  
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Sincere is Not Substantial and a Corporation Is Not an Orchestra 
CAROLINE MALA CORBIN 
According to Professor Smith, regardless of whether the religious plain-
tiff is an individual or an institution, courts should defer to subjective 
claims of substantial burden, and any attempt to apply objective limits 
implies hostility towards RFRA. Subjecting every law challenged as a 
substantial burden on religion to strict scrutiny is what RFRA contem-
plates, he continues, and to fear the consequences is to conjure up a “parade 
of horribles” that will never come to pass. See supra at 275-76. Yet courts 
adopt objective legal tests all the time for reasons other than hostility. Nor 
is the “parade of horribles” entirely theoretical: Indeed, one might argue 
that the parade is well underway when a court can entertain the notion that 
a secular, for-profit corporation has a religious “conscience” that is substan-
tially burdened by offering comprehensive health insurance. See, e.g., Grote 
v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 855 (7th Cir. 2013) (staying application of Mandate 
to manufacturer of vehicle safety systems); Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 
2012 WL 6757353, at *5 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (same for construction 
firm); Legatus v. Sebelius, No. 12-12061, 2012 WL 5359630, at *15 (E.D. 
Mich. Oct. 31, 2012) (same for business selling outdoor power equipment); 
Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1295 (D. Colo. 2012) (same for 
manufacturer of HVAC equipment). 
I. ABSOLUTE DEFERENCE TO A SUBJECTIVE VIEW  
OF RELIGIOUS BURDEN 
Professor Smith argues that “[r]eligious freedom . . . means that no 
outsider—and certainly not the government—gets to tell me what my 
faith is, or what it does or does not prohibit.” See supra at 275. This is 
quite true. If someone believes their religion condemns abortion, it is not 
the government’s place to conclude otherwise. But not all perceived 
burdens equal a “substantial burden” for legal purposes. That is, a court 
decision that a law does not impose a “substantial burden” under RFRA 
does not mean that the government is asserting superior theological 
knowledge. Rather, it is a judgment that the government does not consid-
er the burden the type that triggers strict scrutiny. Professor Smith would 
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like to conflate every alleged burden with a “substantial burden” under 
RFRA. But they are not necessarily the same.  
As RFRA makes explicit, the law’s strict scrutiny provision is triggered 
only by substantial burdens on religion, not all burdens on religion. To 
simply assume a substantial burden whenever someone claims one exists 
essentially reads out that requirement. Without some objective evaluation 
of burden, all burdens would become eligible for accommodation. Would 
this really be so bad? Consider a couple of scenarios.  
Scenario number one: Imagine that Plan B is not an abortifacient. (It is 
not.) Assume too that every reputable scientific study to examine Plan B’s 
mechanism concludes that it works not by preventing fertilized eggs from 
implanting but by immobilizing sperm and stopping ovulation in the first 
instance. See, e.g., Julie Rovner, Morning-After Pills Don’t Cause Abortion, 
Studies Say, NPR (Feb. 21, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/ 
blogs/health/2013/02/22/172595689/morning-after-pills-dont-cause-abortion-
studies-say. And for the sake of argument, let’s assume there is no debate in 
the scientific community about this scientific fact. See, e.g., Jamie Manson, 
What an Abortifacient Is–And What It Isn’t, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER 
(Feb. 20, 2012), http://ncronline.org/blogs/grace-margins/what-abortifacient-
and-what-it-isnt. Accordingly, Plan B is contraception and covered by the 
Contraception Mandate. Now imagine that a plaintiff rejects these scientific 
findings as inconclusive and maintains that Plan B is an abortifacient and 
consequently believes, sincerely, that providing it to employees violates his 
religious conscience. Under Professor Smith’s subjective approach—
where the government dare not question anyone’s conclusion that a law 
imposes a substantial burden—the employer should be exempt from the 
Mandate unless it passes strict scrutiny.  
Scenario number two: Plaintiffs, owners and managers of a secular, for-
profit corporation, view their company as an extension of themselves. As a 
result, they sincerely believe that their company’s subsidization of contra-
ception contravenes their religious obligations and imposes a substantial 
religious burden on them as individuals. As a matter of law, however, 
corporations and their owners are entirely separate legal entities. This 
division is actually the point of incorporation: “Incorporation’s basic 
purpose is to create a distinct legal entity with legal rights, obligations, 
powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who 
created it, who own it, or whom it employs.” Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. 
v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001). Consequently, for owners to argue that 
requiring their corporations to pay for contraception is akin to forcing them 
to pay ignores the basic, legal structure of the corporation. The corporation 
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is not the alter ego of the owner; the corporation’s money is not the owner’s 
money. On the contrary, owners who treat corporate funds as their own 
would find themselves in a great deal of trouble. As Judge Ilana Rovner 
observed, “So long as the business’s liabilities are not the [plaintiff’s] 
liabilities—which is the primary and invaluable privilege conferred by the 
corporate form—neither are the business’s expenditures the [plaintiffs]’ own 
expenditures.” Grote, 708 F. 3d at 858 (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
Should courts ignore science and accept the claim that providing Plan B 
violates deeply held religious beliefs against abortion? Likewise, when a 
business owner complains of a substantial burden, should courts ignore 
hornbook law that a corporation is not the alter ego of its owner? In both 
cases, the subjective claim of substantial religious burden may well be 
sincere. In both cases, however, it ought to be rejected. In doing so the 
government is not claiming to know the plaintiff’s religious beliefs better 
than the plaintiff. In the first scenario, a court can assume religious opposi-
tion to abortion (even if broadly defined to include preventing implanta-
tion), but still find that, as a matter of science, Plan B it is not an 
abortifacient. In the second scenario, a court would not be disputing 
religious tenets but acknowledging that, as a matter of law, the corporation 
is a distinct legal entity. And once it is accepted that there are objective 
limits to the burdens the state must contemplate accommodating, why 
shouldn’t the state decide that some burdens are, objectively speaking, 
simply too attenuated for purposes of RFRA?  
In fact, courts have not only the ability but the responsibility to evalu-
ate whether the burdens caused by the Contraception Mandate are 
substantial enough to merit accommodation under RFRA. After all, it is 
not just the rights of employers that are at stake, but the rights of their 
employees. Accommodating employers imposes costs on their employees. 
As discussed in my first reply, religiously motivated restrictions on health 
care implicates employees’ equality and religious liberty. The suggestion 
that unhappy workers will simply seek employment elsewhere overlooks 
economic reality and the huge power imbalance between employers and 
employees. In any event, to require employee-protective laws to pass 
strict scrutiny when the burden is slight for the employers seeking to 
circumvent them is not the balance RFRA envisioned.  
A.  Corporations as religious institutions 
So far this second reply has focused on actual people seeking the protec-
tion of RFRA, whether they are the head of a religiously affiliated organiza-
tion or the owner of a company. But what if the plaintiff is not a natural 
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person but an institutional “person”? Professor Smith correctly observes 
that some people honor their religious commitments communally. His 
metaphor of musicians playing together in an orchestra is lovely and may 
well mirror people’s experience of their church, synagogue, mosque or other 
voluntary religious association. See supra at 276. Nonetheless, these types of 
voluntary institutions are not the institutions seeking exemptions under 
RFRA. Religious organizations like churches, synagogues, and mosques are 
not at issue in Contraception Mandate cases (or my discussion of them) 
because they are exempt. The Mandate does not apply to them.  
The institutions seeking exemption from the Contraception Mandate are 
not voluntary associations but nonprofit and for-profit corporations. They are 
not composed of voluntary members uniting around a common religious 
vision; they are composed of employers and employees. Of course, it is 
possible that some employees view themselves as participating in a collective 
religious enterprise. But many of them do not. Instead, many do not share 
their employer’s faith and they show up for work in order to earn a living. 
They include factory workers, nurse’s aides, store managers, sales associates, 
drivers, food packers, custodial staff, and administrative assistants, among 
others, who depend on their paycheck and benefits to take care of themselves 
and their families. For many, their job is not a religious experience but a way 
to survive. Whatever may be said about voluntary members and religious 
associations, it does not translate to employees and corporations.  
CONCLUSION 
Religious liberty is a fundamental value in our society. But it is not 
the only value: Equality is as fundamental. Adding equality to the 
equation means first, employers should not be able to presumptively 
override the equal rights of their employees. And second, when arguing 
in favor of religious liberty, it is important to ensure that the right to 
religious liberty does not accrue only to the elite. Exempting for-profit 
corporations from the Contraception Mandate would allow the (more 
powerful) owners to force their religious views onto their (less powerful) 
workers who may hold entirely different beliefs. It would be a shame if 
yet another aspect of the American dream were reserved for those at the 
top at the expense of everyone else. 
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